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T.J. Pempel*
The Trade Imbalance Isn't
the Problem
Once each month the United States Department of Commerce
announces the nation's trade balance for the previous month. Invariably
of major attention is the specific figure for bilateral trade between the
United States and Japan. In recent years this has constituted about one-
third of total U.S. Trade. For a week to ten days prior to the announce-
ment, stock market traders, Federal Reserve officials, interested politi-
cians and economic pundits of diverse ideological stripes offer
predictions on what the number is likely to be, the meaning of specific
ranges of numbers, the presumed policy implications should the
number be up or down over the prior month and so forth. Inevitably,
the actual announcement is then followed by a similar flurry of instant
analysis, while behavior on the U.S. stock and bond markets for the next
several days is widely alleged to have been heavily determined by the
announced numbers.'
Bilateral merchandise trade between the United States and Japan
has become one of the most widely cited indicators in the general and
financial press within the United States. It has become one of the most
frequently employed weapons in the arsenal of daily political debate
concerning the nature of the United States-Japan relationship, as well as
America's economic and strategic position in the world. Partisans to the
debate typically congregate around one of two rather bifurcated posi-
tions. On one side are those who argue thatJapanese products sell well
primarily because of quality and cost, that the Japanese market is largely
open, that formal tariff levels and other trade barriers in Japan have
been reduced to levels at or below those of any other industrialized
country, that the Japanese government and private industry have made
great efforts to attract foreign imports to Japan, and that the failure of
* Professor of Government, Cornell University.
1. Occasionally, the numbers are "worse" than predicted, and the markets do
well, such as happened in mid-January when November's "terrible" figure of a jump
of 22% in the trade deficit was announced and the Dow Jones Industrials rose 24
points. Then my local headline read "Market Shrugs Off Trade Deficit, Soars 24
Points." Honolulu Advertiser, Jan. 19, 1989, at C-9. The point here is that regard-
less of any actual link, people in various walks are acting as though there is a link.
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the United States to export more to Japan lies largely with the U.S. gov-
ernment's failure to rectify its massive national budget deficits, and with
private industry's failure to "try harder" within the Japanese
marketplace.
2
Juxtaposed against such positions are those holding that Japan's
overseas successes are aided by a welter of government programs and
oligopolistic practices; that although formal tariff levels may indeed be
low, beneath them lies a subterranean maze of non-tariff barriers
designed to keep out or constrain a vast array of American products.
The evidence adduced is the bilateral trade figure, which was roughly
even in 1973, and then jumped to $10 billion in favor ofJapan in 1980,
$15 billion in 1981, $33 billion in 1984 and to around $60 billion annu-
ally since 1986. If the Japanese aren't doing something funny, the argu-
ment goes, such a shift would have been impossible.3
To this abstract macro-level criticism is added an amusing arsenal
of anecdotes, from former Secretary of State George Shultz's complaint
that his morning glass of orange juice at Tokyo's Imperial Hotel cost
over $10; to the many journalistic reports concerning honeydew melons
costing $2 in California but selling for $30 in Tokyo; to the hoards of
Japanese tourists who allegedly find it cheaper to buy Japanese cameras
at New York's 47th Street Photo than in comparable shops in Shinjuku.
The result for many American policymakers has been an undeniable
portrait of an open America and a closed Japan.
Certainly the latter position is one with which most Americans, par-
ticularly business leaders, politicians, and journalists, are familiar. Most
are usually quick to cite concrete examples to demonstrate alleged
dumping ofJapanese televisions or semiconductors, while being equally
quick with examples designed to show just how closed to American man-
ufactured goods the Japanese market really is. Thus, when American
exporters of aluminum baseball bats began to gobble up large shares of
the market in Japan, suddenly the size, shape and, by at least one
account, the sound, of the American imports were declared inappropri-
ate forJapanese batters, and the American product was shut out in favor
of presumably lower quality, but more culturally acceptable Japanese
equivalents. Even though Japanese manufacturers produced nothing
comparable, paddle ball rackets for the American Club in Tokyo were
2. This brief paragraph obviously summarizes a wide array of positions, but it is
close to the official position of the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and
Industry. See also T. SATO, THE U.S.-JAPAN TRADE IMBALANCE FROM THEJAPANESE PER-
SPECTIVE (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 2497, Jan.,
1988).
3. This position can be found most strongly among U.S. congressmen such as
SenatorJohn Danforth and Representative Richard Gephart. In 1987 Representative
Gephart offered an amendment to a trade bill that called for investigation of trade
barriers in any nations having large bilateral surpluses with the United States. His
views were also made clear during the 1988 Democratic primary elections. A more
nuanced, but still highly critical piece can be found in C. PRESTOWITZ, TRADING
PLACES: How WE ALLOWED JAPAN TO TAKE THE LEAD (1988) (chapter 3 summarizes
many of the competing viewpoints on the bilateral trade issue).
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held up at customs for several weeks as officials queried the purchasers
as to their need for such foreign merchandise. The story of European
skis has been well reported. Allegedly Japanese government officials
declared that European skis which had come to achieve a high level of
customer appreciation in Japan could no longer be considered safe for
Japanese slopes and customers since they had been tested on the alleg-
edly quite different "European snow," not the most assuredly uniquely
different "Japanese snow. ' 4 Finally, Japanese officials anxious to keep
out imports of vastly cheaper, and allegedly quite as good, American
rice declared foreign rice to be a health hazard for Japanese consumers
since (as is apparently well known) Japanese intestines are significantly
longer than Western intestines.
As a consequence of such ridiculously close-minded opposition to
specific products, it is hard for many Americans to take seriously official
Japanese claims that their markets are formally open and foreign compe-
tition is welcomed. For many Americans, the causes of the current trade
imbalance unmistakably lie with a deceitful and manipulative Japan, get-
ting a "free ride on defense" while achieving through economic means
what it failed to achieve militarily during World War II. If the trends
continue, they argue, the United States will become "the New Manchu-
ria," supplying inexpensive agricultural and other primary products for
processing in Japan, while serving as the principal market for Japanese
manufactured goods. Or as it has been alternatively formulated: if cur-
rent trends continue, the United States will be the world's largest manu-
facturer of ICBMs and hamburgers and the Japanese will make
everything in between.
5
It is not surprising that over the past several years the official U.S.
response to its trade deficit withJapan has moved from multilateral and
macro-economic approaches to an insistence on so-called MOSS (mar-
ket oriented, sector selective) negotiations designed to examine ways to
overcome obstacles to U.S. marketing success in specific sectors of the
Japanese market, such as timber, wine, electronics, tobacco and the
like. 6 As these have proven incapable of rapid rectification of the trade
deficit, some post-MOSS thinking now focuses on even more explicit
guarantees of specific market shares or total sales for U.S. companies on
a sector-by-sector or product-by-product basis. In short, some in the
4. With suitable apologies to the various native inhabitants of the Alaskan and
Canadian tundras, who according to widely cited linguistic examples have languages
which recognize dozens of types of snow, it is hard to believe that there was any
factual basis to the Japanese claims.
5. I first heard this phrase from Professor Chalmers Johnson, University of Cali-
fornia, San Diego, at a forum in 1983. It has been widely repeated since.
6. The MOSS talks were begun as a result of a request from President Reagan to
Prime Minister Nakasone in late 1984, and the talks began in Tokyo in January, 1985
with the first items targeted being telecommunications, pharmaceuticals and medical
equipment, electronics and forest products.
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United States now demand managed trade. 7 Anything less, it is alleged,
will be proof that Japan is not truly open to American competition. If
such actions do not "force" open the Japanese market to America's pre-
sumably superior products, the U.S. government would be urged to
engage in quid pro quo restrictions of its markets.8
Others take a different political tack, contending that the U.S. must
refocus its efforts at becoming more competitive in the export of manu-
factured goods. This means in many ways "out-Japanizing", the Japa-
nese: a focused industrial policy, reduction in anti-monopoly
regulations that prevent information sharing, more engineers, more col-
laborative research and development, longer time perspectives for U.S.
corporations, and the like. All of these would be designed to strengthen
the U.S. industrial and manufacturing base.9
These latter arguments partly parallel official Japanese reactions to
the bilateral trade deficits. Japanese views seem roughly to be that for
every example of baseball bats, skis or paddle balls, they can cite an
American company which sought instant success in Tokyo or Osaka by
sending its former Brazilian or Italian market manager to Japan with no
long term strategy, no Japanese language executives, and expectations
of success in weeks, not years, only to leave in frustration when orders
did not pour in, complaining about the "closed Japanese market." Many
Japanese would argue that Americans are failing to get their own house
in order, while the U.S. government remains excessively supine before
various specialized interests unable to compete effectively in the world
markets. Besides, they ask, just how important are baseball bats, skis,
tobacco, and orange juice within the broader framework of a liberal
trade regime, Japan's recent market opening measures, and the actual
successes of many Western firms doing business in Japan.l 0 They hap-
pily side with those in America urging more focus on industrial competi-
tiveness and macro-economic policy adjustments within the United
States, though they part company when suggestions arise for retaliation
if the trade balance does not show rapid reorientation.
The battle thus rages. As Stephen Krasner succinctly phrased it:
"On the U.S. side, there are persistent accusations that the Japanese are
not playing by the same rules. On the Japanese side, there is the percep-
tion that Americans are tailoring their interpretation of the rules, if not
7. See, e.g., Baucus, A New Trade Strategy: The Case For Bilateral Agreements, 22 COR-
NELL INT'L LJ. 1, 8, 12-14 (1989).
8. The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, § 301, 19 U.S.C.A.
§ § 2901, 2411, with the so-called "super 301," is a recent indication of the actual
political trend in this direction.
9. One of the best formulations of this argument is Zysman & Cohen, Double or
Nothing: Open Trade and Competitive Industry, 61 FOR. AFFAIRS 113 (Summer 1983). See
also S. COHEN &J. ZYSMAN, MANUFACTURING MATTERS (1987).
10. In addition to the Japanese complaints, there is more academic evidence sup-
porting the claims of United States particularism in its protectionist efforts. See Gold-




the rules themselves, to suit specific circumstances."I
The entire debate, I wish to argue, while it has many valid compo-
nents, is basically misguided. It is about the wrong data at the wrong
time. In many ways, the debate is little more than a political manifesta-
tion of the old saw about the drunk groping around under a lamp post
late at night in search of his car keys. Though joined in his search by a
sympathetic policeman, after fifteen minutes of unsuccessful searching,
no keys were to be found. Finally the policeman asked, "Are you sure
you dropped them here?"
"No," replied the drunk, "I dropped them a block away."
"Then why are you looking here?" inquired the policeman.
"Because the light here is so much better," came the reply.
Although the light may be better surrounding the bilateral trade balance
figures, that is not the locus of the "real" problems.
I. What is Wrong with the Focus on the Trade Balance?
At one level the answer to the above question is, quite obviously, "noth-
ing." Bilateral trade figures, like many other economic indicators, have
a certain exactitude that conveys accurate and useful information. But it
is a serious mistake to allow a single indicator to become a surrogate
that masks a host of much broader and more complex problems.
Implied in the trade numbers is some sense that they reflect to the sec-
ond or third decimal point an undeniable snapshot of who is benefitting
and who is losing in the economic relationship between the U.S. and
Japan. Too often the focus on the bilateral trade relationship conveys
the impression that the relative costs of a negative balance are dispro-
portionately borne by the United States, its citizens, its workers and its
businesses, while the corresponding benefits accrue principally to their
Japanese counterparts. But to deal with such questions, the bilateral
trade figure is totally inadequate.
The most obviously mistaken element in the bilateral trade discus-
sion is that the bilateral economic relationship between Japan and the
United States, important as it most assuredly is, remains only a small
part of a much more complex set of links between the two countries that
includes security, overseas aid, cultural and intellectual exchanges, and
so forth. These bilateral ties, meanwhile, are embedded in, and con-
stantly intertwine with, an even broader set of multilateral and regional
relationships that are far more than bilateral in nature. While many who
take specific positions on the economic and trade issues are occasionally
sensitive to the interplay between bilateral trade and these other dimen-
sions, all too often they are not. But obviously, the complex cultural,
security, and political relationship between Japan and the United States
and their links to broader regional and international currents transcend
the simple numbers shown on the balance sheet for bilateral trade.
11. Japan and the United States: Prospects for Stability, in 2 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
JAPAN 403 (T. Inoguchi & D. Okimoto eds. 1988).
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This is not the place for a detailed discussion of this issue, but U.S.
bases in Japan; free exchange of books, magazines, orchestras, fellow-
ships and students; joint economic aid to countries like the Philippines,
Egypt, and South Korea; regional relationships among the United
States, Japan and various Asian countries-are all items that have bene-
fits completely ignored in the debates over Japanese automobile or
video cassette recorder sales in the United States; or American citrus,
meat, and tobacco sales in Japan. So too are the even broader security
and defense alliances of both countries, the maintenance of a liberal
trade and monetary regime, the freedom of cultural exchange, and so
forth.
This is not to deny the importance of bilateral economic relations.
They are indeed critical to both countries, and they must be analyzed as
such. But even in this narrower context, the bilateral trade figures are
hopelessly misleading. Probably the most important economic point to
make about the bilateral trade balance is the obvious one that "nothing
in economic theory implies that bilateral trade or current-account bal-
ances between any two countries must be zero. A country could have a
zero balance on its global current account while having very large sur-
pluses and deficits with all of its individual trading partners."' 12
Even accepting this broad caveat, there are a host of additional eco-
nomic problems surrounding the wide use of the bilateral trade figures so
widely cited in the United States. Several need to be highlighted. First,
the bilateral trade figures are typically discussed in dollars, not in yen.
Were they differently denominated, the recent picture on bilateral trade
would appear very different. In 1986, for example, the Japanese trade
surplus was up by 30.1% in dollars, but it fell by 7.6% in yen.
Second, the trade figures typically include only merchandise trade
and do not include trade in services. For American companies, a good
deal of profit comes from investments abroad, travel and transportation
receipts, and other services such as finance, shipping, and the like. In
these areas the United States does very well, and when such figures are
calculated the overall "trade picture" between Japan and the United
States is less dramatically one-sided.
A third problem concerns the way total bilateral trade between
Japan and the United States has expanded tremendously in absolute vol-
ume over the past 25 years or so. Within this overall expansion, the
United States-notJapan-remains the world's largest exporting nation.
Within the context of this expansion, Japan has become an increasingly
important market for an even larger total of those U.S. exports. In 1960
Japan received about 6 percent of total U.S. exports; today that figure is
nearly double. Japan takes in approximately 20 percent of all U.S.
exports, and is the second largest customer for United States exports
behind only Canada. In many product areas, Japan i- America's best
customer. It is, for example, the major market for agricultural exports,
12. E. LINCOLN, JAPAN: FACING ECONOMIC MATURITY 230 (1988).
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taking a total equal to more than that of the United States's next three
largest export markets (the Soviet Union, the Netherlands, and Canada).
For products such as citrus fruits, pork, beef and veal, Japan accepts
from 50% to 80% of all U.S. exports.
13
Still a fourth point concerning bilateral trade figures is that they are
not automatically the outgrowth of the presumed guilty party-Japanese
protectionism. As Under Secretary of State Allen Wallis noted in 1986,
"[t]he [bilateral trade] deficit rose by $13 billion in 1985, butJapan did
not erect $13 billion worth of new barriers against our products."1 4 In
this vein, several studies have revealed that even if all non-tariff barriers
in Japan were removed, only about 10% of the total bilateral trade defi-
cit would be eliminated. 15
Additionally, one must note that the United States, despite its rhe-
torical commitment to the principles of "free trade" (lately amended to
"fair trade"), is by no means without its own massive and increasing
protectionist barriers. So-called voluntary export agreements now
structure U.S. trade with a number of countries. In recent years, the
United States also has added explicit restrictions on the quantity or
import prices of beef, mushrooms, motorcycles, textiles, and a host of
other products. Some 40% of all U.S. imports are now subject to some
form of protectionist controls, a vast increase that took place largely
during the Reagan presidency. Among the most egregious examples of
U.S. protection is sugar, where the U.S. consumer is forced to pay at
least 4 times world market prices due to U.S. import restrictions. While
Japanese officials often defend their protection of rice as necessary
because rice is an almost religious part of the Japanese diet, a compara-
ble argument about the role of sugar in the American diet has fortu-
nately been absent.
Perhaps most significantly, the bilateral figures conceal what is
often a far more complex trade picture based on direct investments in
one another's country: the out-sourcing of component products by
companies headquartered in one country, but with branches in the
other; and most important, profits achieved by such multinational com-
panies. Consider only the following types of examples. Faced with so-
called voluntary export restrictions on Japanese automobiles shipped to
the United States, Honda Motors, along with a number of other Japa-
13. KEIZAI KOHO CENTER, JAPAN: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON, 1987, at 18, 38
(1987).
14. A. Wallis, U.S.-Japan Economic Relations: The Tokyo Summit and Beyond,
Address at the U.S.-Japan Economic Agenda Meeting, Washington, D.C. (Apr. 23,
1986), reprinted in 826 CURRENT POLICY 1 (1986). See also, Wallis, Economics, Foreign
Policy, and United States-Japanese Trade Disputes, 22 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 381 (1989).
15. C. BERGSTEIN & W. CLINE, THE UNITED STATES-JAPAN ECONOMIC PROBLEM
(1985) (estimating that U.S. exports to Japan might increase by $5-8 billion if all
Japanese trade barriers were removed and that this would not necessarily affect the
trade balance per se). In 1984 and 1985, even U.S. officials announced that ifJapan
were to remove all of its trade barriers, the bilateral imbalance would shrink by only
about $10 billion, or just under one-third of the 1984 imbalance. Japan and U.S. Aail
Down Four Areas in Trade Talks, Japan Econ.J., Feb. 5, 1985, at 28, col. 1.
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nese auto manufacturers, set up American facilities. Leaving aside for a
moment the question of whether such cars manufactured in the United
States are Japanese or American (let alone just how they benefit differ-
ent groups of Japanese or Americans), there is now a problem for bilat-
eral trade statistics. Honda has begun exporting cars from its
Marysville, Ohio plant to Japan and now has become America's fourth
largest auto exporter. Meanwhile, GM, Ford, and Chrysler all have
major joint ventures in Japan that involve, among other things, import-
ing products made for them in Japan for assembly in the United States.
Technically these appear as "Japanese imports." In a similar vein, IBM
and Texas Instruments both source many of their components from
their wholly-owned subsidiaries in Japan. 16 Which items, if any, should
be considered U.S. exports and which should be Japanese exports? If
one decides simply on the basis of which direction across the Pacific a
specific item of cargo is headed the answer is clear. If one asks which
country's companies benefitted more, the answer is far less obvious.
One thing is certain: a large share ofJapanese exports to the United
States are in fact structurally tied to American companies rather than
being autonomous exports by Japanese companies. Thus, 13% ofJapa-
nese exports are parts, largely to U.S. firms; 9% are items not produced
in the United States, such as cameras or VCRs marketed here by Ameri-
can retailers; an additional 3% are Japan made items produced for
export under the brand names of U.S. distributors such as Sears.
Finally, 6% of Japan's exports consist of finished products sent from
Japan to the United States by foreign, mostly American, firms. In sum,
approximately one-quarter of so-called Japanese exports to the United
States are structurally linked to the production and marketing activities
of American firms on their home territory.
This bilateral trade problem becomes even more complex when one
considers joint ventures between Japanese and American firms, let alone
three or four way ventures, as well as the economic implications of the
high levels of mutual investment in each other's markets. At one time,
the U.S. pharmaceutical giant Merck exported drugs to Japan. In the
early 1980s, Merck acquired two Japanese companies, Banyu and Torii,
and now ranks among the three largest pharmaceutical companies in
Japan. By doing so, Merck has vastly increased its total sales in Japan,
even though its actual exports have diminished. Though Merck as a
company gained, it did so in a way that worsened the bilateral trade bal-
ance for the United States as a whole. How does one interpret the
change?
16. "By 1982, for example, Texas Instruments-Japan exported, principally to its
parent, one-half of the estimated $300 million worth of memory chips it produced.
IBM-Japan, the only IBM subsidiary in the world making XT model disk drives,
exported 100 percent of its production to its U.S. parent." Encarnation, Cross-Invest-
nzent. A Second Front of Economic Rivalry, in AMERICA VERSUS JAPAN 141 (T. McCraw ed.
1986). Texas Instruments produces all of the 64 K RAM chips for its worldwide
operations in Japan; IBM sources over half of its IBM PC components there. GM,
Ford, and Chrysler all have major joint ventures there.
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Such direct investments make bilateral trade figures almost mean-
ingless. Most strikingly, one calculation that combined bilateral trade
with actual profits by subsidiaries of each nation's companies in the
other's markets concluded that there was an almost perfect balance
between profits to the U.S. companies and their subsidiaries and profits
to the Japanese companies and their subsidiaries, once exports and in-
country profits were combined. 17 The rate of return of U.S. foreign
direct investment was about 15% in 1987, while that for foreign invest-
ment in the U.S. was only 3%.18 Moreover, sales by U.S. affiliates within
Japan are four times larger than Japan's bilateral trade surplus. What
this means, simply, is that while merchandise trade between the two
countries may be starkly out of balance, the overall economic relation-
ship between the two is far less askew. American companies in the
aggregate are selling about as much in Japan as Japanese companies in
the aggregate are selling in America. A most important difference is
that much of what these American companies are selling is actually pro-
duced in Japan as well, whereas the Japanese, with generally lower levels
of overseas investment than their American counterparts, are shipping
lots of their products across the Pacific.
Thus, if the trade figures properly ignored the sales of American
manufacturing firms in Japan back to American parent companies, and
properly accounted for sales of U.S. and Japanese companies in one
another's markets (rather than just goods that moved between these
countries by boat or plane) there would be virtually no bilateral deficit.
Phrased differently, Japan would be importing more from America's
shores if it did not enjoy direct in-country access to such American prod-
ucts as Schick razor blades, Black & Decker tools, Motorola pagers, IBM
computers, Coca Cola, Johnson & Johnson Pampers, and McDonalds
burgers.
Add to such complications partial production in each country, plus
more regional or multilateral economic links such as production in an
export free zone in Hong Kong or the Caribbean, financing by the bank
17. Ohmae, The Fictitious Japan-U S. Imbalance, XIII, 2 JAPAN ECHO 7 (1986). An
interesting microcosmic datum supports the same point. Id. at 117-18. In 1984, each
American spent an average of $243 on Japanese imports plus an additional $44 dol-
lars on "Japanese goods" that involved value added by virtue of Japanese invest-
ments for a total of $287 per American. In contrast, each Japanese spent $215 on
American imports (significantly below the figure of American purchases ofJapanese
imports) but an additional $266 on other American goods produced within Japan for
a total of $553, nearly twice the amount spent by Americans for "Japanese goods."
Encarnation, supra note 16, at 117-18. Given the fact that Japan's population is
roughly one-half that of the U.S., some overall equanimity is suggested, but even
more striking is that the average Japanese buys twice as much American merchandise
as his American counterpart buys of Japanese goods.
18. Iwata, U.S.-Japan Economic Relations: Ajapanese Perspective (University of
Tokyo, Komaba Department of Social and International Relations, Working Paper
No. 7, 1988). Studies by the American Chamber of Commerce inJapan suggest simi-
lar return levels for U.S. companies doing business in Japan; often the return levels
are closer to 18% than 15%.
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of still a third country, and one can see how limited a picture of eco-
nomic realities is created by the simple statistics of bilateral manufac-
tured trade. The most fundamental reality is that a nation's economic
well-being and the character of its international economic interactions
are at best only partially uncovered in bilateral trade figures. Certainly,
the total economic relationship between the world's two largest econo-
mies, the United States and Japan, has become vastly more complicated,
and by all means far more integrated than is conveyed by the bilateral
trade figures.
All of this provides a version of statistical overkill designed simply
to show a few of the important items that are lost in the microscopic
focus on bilateral trade figures alone. Clearly, these points should sus-
tain an argument that there is far more to the economic relationship
between the United States and Japan than simple bilateral trade figures
convey. The bilateral economic relationship between Japan and the
United States is vastly more intricate, convoluted, and reciprocal than
that single figure implies. This bilateral economic relationship is com-
plicated even further by the regional and international relationships
which surround and include it.
Yet macroeconomics aside, there are two fundamental realities
concealed within the bilateral trade numbers that provide the political
propulsion that keep it so vividly before the American public. Both of
these are political in nature. First, there has been a very real shift in the
international balance of power, a central component of which is the rela-
tive economic decline of the Unites States. Second, there are many
important political constituencies in the United States which are scream-
ing very loudly about the impact ofJapanese imports on them and their
economic fortunes, while different but similarly important constituen-
cies are equally vocal in demanding official help in their efforts to gain
some share of the extensive and lucrative Japanese domestic market.
These two political points lie at the heart of the political importance
given to the economic debates about the bilateral trade relationship.
H. The Politics of Bilateral Trade
For the political scientist looking at the current disputes concerning
U.S.-Japan trade, as well as the broader economic relations between the
two countries, two points are particularly critical. First, as has been
widely noted, the yawning bilateral trade deficit with Japan is but a part
of America's much more substantial trade deficit with all areas of the
world. The U.S. trade gap withJapan (as well as with Asia's newly indus-
trialized countries) is only one component of a much larger shrinking of
the U.S. trade position throughout the world. The United States
enjoyed a positive balance of trade from 1893 until 1971. Since the mid-
dle of the 1970s, however, the overall balance of trade for the U.S. has
become increasingly negative; since the early 1980s, the United States
has had an unfavorable balance of trade with every single region of the
Vol 22
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world, including Latin America and Western Europe, once the recipi-
ents of a vastly greater share of U.S. products than these regions sold to
America. This shift has been exceptionally rapid and geometric; indeed
the trade imbalance during most months of 1988 was more than one and
a half times larger than the entire annual imbalance in 1976.
The United States' share of overall world trade has declined rather
substantially and steadily since the 1950s. In 1950, the United States
supplied 20% of total world exports, 30% of world manufactures and
50% or more of many capital goods and other manufactured products.
Its huge surpluses allowed it to accumulate $24 billion in international
reserves (32% of the world total). By the early 1980s, that share was
only about 13-15% of the world's total exports, and as little as 13% of
the world's manufactured exports.' 9 Japanese companies were among
the most successful in capturing markets lost by U.S. companies both in
this country and abroad. Yet, the Japanese balance, even though equal
to one-fourth to one-third of the current U.S. total imbalance, is by no
means unusual within the context of the overall decline suffered by the
United States in its total trade.20 It is far less the cause, and far more the
consequence, of an overall structural decline in U.S. export competitive-
ness throughout the world, particularly in manufactured goods.
Part of this overall decline is the logical and inevitable outgrowth of
the extremely distorted production and trade advantages the United
States enjoyed at the end of World War II. The United States was virtu-
ally the world's only industrialized country to emerge from the war with
a higher index of industrial production than when the war began.
Almost all of Western Europe as well as Japan saw their industrial infra-
structures decimated by the war. In contrast, the United States emerged
with a substantially stronger industrial and manufacturing base, having
undergone "total mobilization" for the war, but never suffering the
losses associated with having itself been a battlefield. 2 1
This did at least two important things. First, it artificially inflated
the worldwide economic dominance of the U.S. and its firms. Second, it
induced a false sense of international economic superiority throughout
American government and business. Without competition, worldwide
19. Yoffie, Protecting World Markets, in AMERICA VERSUS JAPAN 51 (T. McGraw ed.
1986).
20. A number of scholars have examined this point, but among the more compel-
ling works are R. ROSECRANCE, THE RISE OF THE TRADING STATE: COMMERCE AND
CONQJUEST IN THE MODERN WORLD (1986); U.S. COMPETITIVENESS IN THE WORLD
ECONOMY (B. Scott & G. Lodge eds. 1985); R. GILPIN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1987), see ch. 5; and R. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY:
COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY (1984).
21. Comparing the major countries' indices of industrial production, only Swe-
den (which was neutral in the war) and Britain came out of the war "ahead" of where
they had been industrially in the late 1930s. In both cases, their improvements were
marginal. The U.S., in contrast, emerged with a production index approximately
757o higher than that of 1938. See, e.g., P. ARMSTRONG, A. GLYN &J. HARRISON, CAPI-
TALISM SINCE WORLD WAR II, THE MAKING AND BREAKUP OF THE GREAT BooM, chs. 2
and 4 (1984).
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business was easy for American companies. For most American compa-
nies, their only serious challengers were other U.S. firms. Together
American companies enjoyed such phenomenal technological advan-
tages over most of their foreign competitors that virtually any citizen of
the world who wished to buy any manufactured item could choose only
from among American produced goods. Numerous industrial sectors in
the U.S. evolved into relatively stable oligopolies with only marginally
increasing demand and high barriers to entry.22 For many American
companies, this induced the unfortunately anti-competitive presumption
that their short-run good fortune was somehow the result of an inher-
ently superior competitiveness. Many proved far less invulnerable once
the economies of Japan, France, Italy, West Germany and others
regained economic momentum, and companies from these countries
began competing effectively for market shares previously held by their
American rivals by default.
At the same time, logical as some decline in relative shares of world
trade would appear to have been for the United States, given the artifici-
ality of its large share in the 1950s and early 1960s, the recent and wide-
spread decline in U.S. shares of world trade goes beyond a mere
righting of some drastically overswung pendulum. Over and above any
such natural reduction in world trade shares, an even more real decline
has occurred in the relative economic position of this country within
world markets. This decline is measurable not only in trade figures, but
also in the relative value of the dollar, in relative growth of gross
national product, in foreign reserves, and most dramatically in the
nation's current account balance.
In assessing this problem of national decline, it is important to rec-
ognize the naturalness of some form of recalibration, and hence not to
overstate the case. Too easily, Japan's real economic gains are taken as
a mistaken sign that it has become the world's most successful econ-
omy.23 In fact, the U.S. is still the world's largest economy by far; its
overall productivity remains the highest in the world (even as it
improves less quickly than that of many of its competitors); it remains
the world's largest trader; many of its specific industries and particular
products are far and away the highest in quality and the most competi-
tive in price in the world.
At the same time, just as it is important not to overreact to the rela-
tive decline in U.S. economic hegemony, complacency about either
American superiority or the Japanese challenge to it would be an even
greater folly. With characteristic candor and insight, Ron Dore, in writ-
22. C. JOHNSON, L. D'ANDREA TYSON & J. ZYSMAN, POLITICS AND PRODUCTIVITY:
THE REAL STORY OF WHY JAPAN WORKS 43 (1989).
23. Though an admirable book in many ways, this is certainly a criticism that
could be leveled at E. VOGEL, JAPAN As NUMBER 1: LESSONS FOR AMERICA (1979). A
subsequent and more balanced treatment of the relative economic positions is U.S.
COMPETITIVENESS IN THE WORLD ECONOMY (B. Scott & G. Lodge eds. 1984). See also
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, AN ASSESSMENT OF U.S. COMPETITIVENESS IN HIGH
TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIES (1983); AMERICA VERSUS JAPAN (T. McCraw ed. 1986).
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ing about the British response to Japanese economic success, sums up
widespread reaction:
To the complacent ones on the Left, Japan is a harsh and oppressive soci-
ety whose competitive success rests on exploitation of low-paid workers.
For the complacent ones on the Right... well, they're a lot of little swots,
aren't they? Good imitators. No humor, no originality. It's hard to take
them seriously.
24
Such a supercilious dismissal ofJapan by Americans would only result in
this country's economy becoming even more dismally akin to that of
Britain's.
In reality, over the past three decades or so, Japan, along with sev-
eral other countries, has politically and economically been structured to
improve its overall international economic competitiveness. Many of
these countries have been deliberately structured as what Chalmers
Johnson has labelled "capitalist developmental states." 25 Over the last
two decades, there has been a dramatic shift in the world's center of
economic gravity towards such states, representing a quantum transfer
of economic muscle from the Atlantic to the Pacific.2 6 It is this shift, and
the conditions behind it, that must be given the most serious attention in
the United States; bilateral trade gaps are but its most tangible
manifestation.
This qualitative shift in the world's economic balance then is the
first political item that must be addressed within the U.S. by political and
economic leaders, for this basic fact of political economy lies at the heart
of the current economic disputes between Japan and the United States.
Failure to recognize these deep-seated causes of the current trade dis-
pute will compel the U.S., like history's unsuccessful generals, to con-
tinue fighting the last, rather than the current, war.
There is a second political observation regarding the current trade
disputes. For the political scientist concerned with costs and benefits to
specific socio-economic groups, rather than for the economist con-
cerned with macro-level economic balances, it is important to stress that
the economic actors within any country facing a negative trade balance
rarely "suffer" equally. Nor do all segments of a country enjoying a pos-
24. R. DORE, TAKING JAPAN SERIOUSLY 3 (1987).
25. Johnson's earliest formulation of this concept was in C. JOHNSON, MITI AND
THE JAPANESE MIRACLE: THE GROWTH OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY, 1925-1975 (1982). He
subsequently expanded on the territorial applicability of the concept to include many
of the Asian newly industrialized countries in Johnson, The Nonsocialist XICs: East
Asia, 40 INT'L ORG. 557 (1986). See also F. DEYO, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE
NEW ASIAN INDUSTRIALISM (1987).
26. According to a study by the NQmura Research Institute, for the two decades
1960-80, neither Japan nor any of the newly industrialized Asian countries ever fell
below an average growth rate of 8.5% per year. By contrast, the U.S. as a whole,
OECD Europe, and the less-developed non-Asian countries hovered around 2.5-
3.0%, except for the huge American surge in 1984. Johnson, The Pacific Basin's Chal-
lenge to Ameica: .1ytl and Reality, USA Today, Mar. 1987, at 22. Total U.S. trade
across the Pacific is now well ahead of that across the Atlantic.
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itive trade balance benefit equally. A nation's overall trade balances,
both cumulative and bilateral, mask a wide array of plus and minus
signs. Thus, many of a nation's industries may confront lower profits in
the face of import competition within their product areas, but that same
nation's consumers typically benefit from lower prices, a broader spec-
trum of choice and often higher quality in the goods they buy. Low cost
imports of industrial or raw materials appear a threat to some, but cer-
tainly not to the manufacturers who use them to reduce their costs or to
increase the profitability of their final products. Nor are there typically
many complaints from workers in industries whose jobs become better
paying and more secure as a result of stable and low cost inputs for the
items they make. Import industries tend to view certain trade
"problems" quite differently from their exporting counterparts. Mean-
while, sellers of shipping insurance can benefit equally from trade going
either into or out of a country, regardless of what happens to the total,
or to bilateral, trade balances. So too do the bankers who finance the
trade or the harbormasters or airport managers who can move goods in
either direction.
The most salient political fact is that overall figures mean nothing to
those whose individual calculations convince them that they have been
hurt. To those who are negatively affected, it is little consolation to
know that their loss has been statistically offset by someone else's suc-
cess. The worker who has lost ajob in a steel plant finds little joy in the
knowledge that elsewhere telecommunications is booming. A failing
plastics firm in a small Ohio town is no less a disaster for its bankrupt
owner, its laid off workers, and the local economy if 2000 miles away,
but operating within the same system of national accounts, a fiber optics
plant in southern California has a gloriously favorable balance sheet.
This point is essential to understanding a large measure of the heat
generated in the U.S. over the current bilateral trade balances, as well as
the overall economic competition between Japan and the United States.
Essentially, the political and economic institutions of Japan, complex
and inefficient as they may often appear to insiders and students ofJapa-
nese policy-making, are, in fact, quite well adapted toward making
Japan's economy more internationally competitive.2 7 In the U.S., by
way of contrast, the dominant political and economic philosophies are
based on separation of institutions, and competition among them. In
terms of international economics, these institutions are very rarely struc-
tured to improve the international competitiveness of American firms or
American products in any categorical way. Since the formation of the
27. Among the more detailed studies ofJapanese policymaking that explore some
of the intricacies of intra-agency and interest group battling, especially as they affect
trade related issues, are I. DESTLER, H. FUKUI & H. SATO, THE TEXTILE WRANGLE:
CONFLICT IN JAPANESE-AMERICAN RELATIONS (1979); 1. DESTLER & H. SATO, COPING
WITH U.S.-JAPANESE ECONOMIC CONFLICTS (1982); N. MINORU, NIHONGATA SEISAKu
KETrEI NO HENYO (1986). See also Pempel, The Unbundling of Japan. Inc.:" The Changing
Dynamics ofJapanese Policy Formation, 13 J. OF JAPANESE STUD. 271 (1987).
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Constitution, and as articulated in the Federalist Papers, American polit-
ical institutions have been predicated on the system of checks and bal-
ances. Congress in particular, and the House of Representatives more
especially, is structurally designed to protect and advance local rather
than national constituency interests. Most of America's antitrust policy
was formulated to protect U.S. consumers from rapacious robber bar-
ons, not to enhance the competitiveness of American products in the
international marketplace.
Certainly a large number of American firms have moved aggres-
sively into the international arena and have done exceptionally well. But
at the same time, vastly greater numbers have focused their attentions
on local or national markets only. When confronted by superior compe-
tition by foreign products, most find automatic allies within the political
system anxious to "protect" them from such "unfair competition"
(rather, for example, than protecting consumers from "protectionism").
The U.S. has the industrial world's lowest ratio of exports to GNP
(5.3%), as well as the world's lowest ratio of imports to GNP (9.1%). By
way of contrast, imports represent 10% of Japan's GNP, and exports
represent 13%. Most of the countries of Western Europe, with their
substantially more integrated markets, have both ratios in the 20-30%
range.
2 8
Even more striking is the fact that America's largest companies,
internationalist as both they and we may see them, are still far less
export-oriented than their Japanese (or European) counterparts.
McCraw presents a revealing comparison of the top ten exporters of
manufactured goods in the U.S. and Japan. 29 Exports as a percent of
total sales for the Japanese firms range from a low of 29% to a high of
71%o, with an average of 48% (my calculations). The American compa-
nies range from 7% to 35%, with an average of 15%. If America's larg-
est and most export conscious firms lag so far behind their Japanese
counterparts in their export orientation, how much more striking must
be the figures for smaller American firms?
The American market has long been the largest in the world. For
many American manufacturers, that was a sufficiently large pie over
which to fight. But now two things have happened. First, foreign firms
have also entered the American market to challenge what was once a
national monopoly on market share, and second, a large number of for-
eign markets have become so economically vast that they are ignored by
an American company only at peril to its own long term
competitiveness.
The Japanese government, and Japanese firms, have long behaved
as if the ultimate marketplace was international in character. Both have
been structured to succeed in such markets. Even small and medium
28. Based on figures in KEIZAi KoHo CENTER, supra note 13, at 31.
29. McGraw, From Partners to Competitors: An Overviez of the Period Since WTorld Mar
II, in AMERICA VERSUS JAPAN 31 (T. McCraw ed. 1986).
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sized Japanese companies know that their ultimate marketplace is the
world at large. The American government and many American firms are
only beginning to learn that basic lesson.3 0 In the meantime, the institu-
tionalization of a predisposition toward protection ofjobs and industries
is far greater in the U.S. than in Japan.
3 '
These two political points must be kept in mind in any discussion of
the economic relations between Japan and the United States, as well as
any proposal for changes that might take place in that relationship in the
1990s.
M. Looking Toward the 1990s
The relationship between Japan and the United States is one of the
most important, and heretofore has been one of the most cooperative
and compatible, in the world. It is important when looking at current
economic disputes to keep that fact in mind, and to build toward coop-
eration rather than competition. Only on such a basis can one begin
making serious suggestions about the next decade.
Equally important is for participants within both countries to begin
to recognize that many of the differences between their two political and
economic systems are, in fact, structural. They are unlikely to go away
easily. The two countries, quite frankly, are rather different in many
important respects. Loud as Japanese government officials may call for
"internationalization," there are bound to be a large number of petty
(and not so petty) officials and business people who will still behave as
xenophobes in their daily behavior-whether on the basis of claims
about the un-Japanese noises made by imported baseball bats, or on
chauvinistic assumptions that American cultural diversity will undercut
America's ability to produce skilled blue collar workers. Japan's keiretsu,
trade associations and information gathering networks, will not be dis-
solved; its product distribution networks are likely to remain highly con-
voluted and intensely loyal to parent firms; the Ministry of Finance will
continue to seek overbalanced budgets;Japanese bureaucrats are still far
more likely to be educated in public administration at Tokyo University
than in Keynesianism at the Kennedy School; Japanese stock brokers will
undoubtedly continue to give inside tips to important politicians.
In a similar vein, America will almost certainly always have more
Congressional officials inclined to seek votes at home by blaming for-
eign competition than supra-partisan "statesmen" willing to sacrifice
their political careers to an assessment of specific political issues in
30. Interesting analysis along these lines is presented in BETWEEN POWER AND
PLENTY: FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES OF ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL STATES (P. Katzen-
stein ed. 1977). See especially the Introduction and Conclusion by Katzenstein, as
well as the chapter on the United States by Krasner and that on Japan by Pempel.
31. This is by no means to suggest thatJapan lacks protectionism. Nevertheless,
the country also appears better structured to phase out its internationally less com-
petitive industries than the United States. See, e.g., Boyer, How Japan Manages Declin-
ing Industies, FORTUNE, Jan. 10, 1983, at 58.
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terms of world history, national interest, or international trade theory.
Many American business leaders will undoubtedly die with their eyes
fixed firmly and fondly on the altar of "The Market." Most top Ameri-
can officials will be chosen for their political connections rather than for
their educational backgrounds or their policy expertise. The American
predisposition toward lawyers, courts and "legal" solutions is unlikely to
vanish in the near term.
Such broad structural traits must be mutually recognized and
accepted as relatively inherent parts of each country's history and tradi-
tion. They contribute to many aspects of each country's approach to
world trade and are not likely to change dramatically in the near term.
Yet, at the present time, considerable political energy in the United
States is being directed at forcingJapan to change many of its structural
traits, on the claim that they constitute unfair trade barriers. Equally
probable of success would be demands fromJapanese counterparts for a
"more rational" U.S. legislature or an end to leveraged buy-outs.
Recent demands for sector-by-sector management of U.S.-Japan
trade or for automatic annual reductions in the bilateral trade imbalance
are equally impractical, and even more harmful to America's long run
economic well-being. Such actions would only freeze in place the
uncompetitive world character of many American industries, leaving
them vastly more vulnerable to competition in the long run.3 2 More-
over, they would make it that much easier politically to avoid the long-
run structural adjustments in the American economy that are essential
to ensure long-term, market compatible, economic vigor in key manu-
facturing areas.
The trade imbalance must be recognized as having a number of
deep structural causes that go far beyond trade per se. Solutions to such
structural problems will require steps that themselves are structural in
character. Consequently, there is not likely to be any quick short-run
solution.
At the same time, steps can be taken by both countries within the
context of their existing systems that will begin to improve bilateral rela-
tions almost immediately. Most importantly, such steps, would be con-
gruent with the kinds of long term, market-compatible adjustments that
will enhance their own long term economic prospects as well. Com-
ments on such a subject must necessarily be perfunctory given time and
space limitations, but in bullet form one should be able to get ready
agreement on several things. On the Japanese side, Japan must:
- continue to liberalize its economy and most especially its imports;
33
32. It is worth remembering that Japan's so-called voluntary export restrictions
on automobiles were designed to give American manufacturers a chance to become
internationally competitive. For at least several years, most chose simply to raise
prices and profits, rather than invest in restructuring.
33. One of the less well known facts about Japan is just how rapidly it has
increased its imports. Between 1985 and 1988, Japanese imports increased 37%,
the largest figure in the industrialized world. THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 7-13, 1989, at 92.
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- make a more serious determination about just how it will recirculate
the money from its trade surplus. Thus far, much has gone into
financing the U.S. debt; far more long term attention must be given to
how it could be used to help reduce excessive U.S. military spending;
- become more sensitive to local American constituent politics in its
trade and investment policies, as many companies have tried to do in
the past, rather than focusing simply on macro-economic suggestions
for America's "improvement."
The bulk of the adjustment, however, must come on the American
side. In effect, the U.S. must begin a systematic effort to become sensi-
tive to the world market place, and to make some serious adjustments to
improve America's long term competitiveness. Again in bullet form, the
U.S. must, among other things:
- begin to deal with the budget deficit; so much has been said about this
problem that it hardly bears repeating, but until some greater balance
is reached, the American standard of living will continue to decline in
relative terms, and the trade and financial problems the country faces
will continue to mount;
- begin to think more systematically, both in government and in compa-
nies, about long term markets;
- increase investment and savings; 34
- put more effort into the training of civilian engineers and technicians.
CurrentlyJapan graduates three times more engineers per capita than
the U.S.; most in Japan work in the civilian industries; most in the U.S.
are in defense areas;
- refocus on the infrastructure behind a successful economy. This
means lowering crime rates, increasing educational levels, rebuilding
roads and tunnels and the like. A world class economy can not be
based exclusively on managerial expertise;
- develop increased international sensitivity. The U.S. has been highly
conscious politically of world developments in the military and secur-
ity areas; it has been far less so in international economic areas. This
balance must be shifted. In particular, American business leaders
must realize that just because it is good enough for Peoria does not
mean it is good enough for the rest of the world. Even more impor-
tantly, Americans anxious to sell abroad must relearn the basic truism
that the languages of business are those of the consumer. Until Amer-
icans begin learning foreign languages, in greater numbers, they are
unlikely to outsell those who at least make the effort to learn the lan-
guage of the country in which they are doing business.3 5
34. Gross fixed investment in Japan remains about twice the level in the United
States, and the costs of capital in Japan are about one-half that in the United States.
35. A well-quoted statistic that is now surely a bit dated, but probably only in
absolute terms, not in proportions, is that there were 8,000 American business peo-
ple in Japan vs. 100,000Japanese in the United States. Virtually all of the Japanese
spoke at least some passing version of English, while probably fewer than 200 of the
Americans spokeJapanese at a comparable level. At the same time, it is worth noting
that just asJapanese imports have increased substantially, so have American exports,
up 51% from 1985-88, again the largest increase in the industrialized world. THE
ECONOMIST, Jan. 7-13, 1989, at 92.
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The apparent simplicity of such proposals might make them appear
beyond challenge to an academic audience. Yet each will require a good
deal of political, economic, and more importantly psychological read-
justment. As such they are unlikely to win easy support from those con-
cerned with day-to-day decision making and momentary crises (such as
monthly trade figures). Consequently, they will not be easy to achieve.
But until such changes are begun, and most particularly, until a far
broader swath of Americans becomes more international in focus, it is
probable that one will continue to see the monthly focus on the bilateral
trade figures. And one will undoubtedly see the continued reiteration of
all of the well-known positions taken on both sides of the issue. Yet so
long as the focus remains on that non-problem, the deeper problems
will continue to be skirted.

